

**Anna-Maria Ioppolo, David N. Sedley (eds.), *Pyrrhonists, Patricians, Platonizers. Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155–86 BC***, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2007, 430 pp., ISBN 978-88-7088-536-1.

The book edited by the two distinguished scholars is the aftermath of the Tenth Symposium Hellenisticum, which was held at the Sapienza University of Rome in July 2004. The volume consists of eight papers, which are preceded by the *Introduction* written by the editors and completed by the chronological table and indexes (of passages of ancient writers and of ancient and modern names). In the *Introduction*, the authors explain, among other things, why it was decided to limit the chronological span of the book to the dates stated in the title. The first date is connected with the famous visit of three Greek philosophers in Rome; they represented three most influential Hellenistic philosophical schools, namely the Stoa, the Academy and the Peripatos. Their lectures, delivered to the audience of Roman intellectuals, begin “the great Roman love affair with philosophy”. In 86 BC, the siege of Athens took place and resulted in philosophers’ escaping from that city, which irretrievably lost its significance as the leading centre of philosophical studies.

J.-L. Ferrary’s paper *Les philosophes grecs à Rome (155–86 av. J.-C.)* refers to the first of the above mentioned historical events. Its importance for the growth of the interest in philosophy among the Romans is richly evidenced in Cicero’s writings, such as the *Tusculanae disputationes* and *De oratore*.

In his paper *Critolaus and Late Peripatetic Philosophy*, D.E. Hahm discusses one of the envoys chosen by the Athenians to represent their polis in front of the Roman people. This representative of the Peripatetic school was very famous in his time, but we have not very many testimonies concerning his teaching (see F. Wehrli [hrsg.], *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar*, H. 10, Basel–Stuttgart 1959). Hahm analyzes the references in ancient writers to this philosopher and his followers in order to find why his name so easily disappeared from historical records of ancient philosophy. The main cause was that he was mainly concerned with presenting the Peripatetic philosophy to the general public and with supporting it against its rivals during the open philosophical debates. Critolaus did not devote his life to carrying on any research started by his predecessors, Aristotle and Theophrastus, and he probably did not write any treatises either. This ‘peculiarity’ as far as the way of philosophizing is concerned shows Critolaus as the original and autonomous thinker. This picture of him is confirmed by his two arguments against rhetoric, namely that it is not necessary to be a good and undefeated speaker and that rhetoric is not an art. This makes him much closer to the Platonic than to the Aristotelian position. It is well known that Plato in his *Gorgias* criticizes rhetoric exactly along these lines. It turns out that also Critolaus was deeply involved in the debate, one of the central questions of that time, about the role and status of rhetoric. In the field of ethics it can be seen, according to Hahm, that there is some convergence between the Stoic and Peripatetic idea of happiness, but this convergence concerns much more the language used than the doctrine itself. (It is worth reminding here that the Stoic terminology, which occurs in the fragments, could be attributed to Critolaus, and this fact was the cause of Wehrli’s sceptical attitude to the fragments.) There is no direct evidence how Critolaus argued that his definition of happiness as “that which is jointly completed from all goods, that is, (all) three kinds” (trans. Hahm, p. 65) could be its correct notion (especially crossing swords with the Stoics). However, Hahm proposes to accept the hypothesis based on Cicero’s indirect evidence that he could use arguments similar to those of Antiochus and Carneades. The definition as well as the concept of τέλειος can again testify to the profound commitment to the ethical debates. Likewise, it has been proved not only by the critical examination made by the Stoics, but also by the polemics which is to be found in the Arius Didymus’ Peripatetic ethical doxography (excerpted and preserved in Stobaeus). As far as Critolaus’ physics is concerned, the same trait is recognized.

An analysis of the fragments allows to show that his thought is Peripatetic in his content, but the debate with the Stoics could be a cause that he tried to express it in the Stoic terminology. Hahm's views seem to revise the ancient opinion (held by Cicero and Strabo) that the Peripatetic school was only at the margin of the philosophical life of that time.

The next two papers discuss questions concerned with the Stoic philosophy. T. Telemann explains the role of the Panaetian philosophy as a part of the Stoicism. He starts by presenting the philosopher's picture as it can be reconstructed from the ancient texts. Next, he ponders how Cicero used Panaetius' philosophy in the *De officiis* and formulates a rather sceptical conclusion that the presence of Panaetius' views in the first two books of this work cannot be taken for certain, especially when the name of the Stoic philosopher is not mentioned. Then he reconstructs the Panaetian views on the soul, emotions, character, and person. The analysis shows that this philosopher made no important changes or turns in development of the Stoic thought, and his historical importance is overvalued.

F. Alesse concentrates her inquiries on the concept of οὐσία and its role in the metaphysical and cosmological thought of Posidonius. She gives her attention mainly to the two fragments – 92 and 96 in the Edelstein–Kidd collection (= 267 and 268 Theiler). First the textual problems with the reference to the fragment 92 are discussed, and then the relation between the concepts of οὐσία and ὕλη. The first can describe both the substratum of the objects with the specific qualities and the substance without given properties. The Posidonian standpoint appears to be in accordance with his Stoic predecessors and his arguments refute the charges levelled against the Stoics by their philosophical rivals.

Sceptical issues are discussed in the essays by J. Annas, A.M. Ioppolo and M. Schofield essays. J. Annas inquires into the classification of the ethical theories made by Carneades and supplements the researches undertaken already by C. Lévy and K. Algra. She focuses particularly on the way in which the classification is used, and differentiates its two kinds. The first is called the sceptical argument, because the systematization serves the argumentation against diverse theories and the author (Cicero in this case) does not agree with any of them. It could be recognized probably as the Carneadean way of proceeding. The second is more positive in its nature, because the classification and argumentation allow to eliminate every theory except the one toward which the author seems to be inclined. A.M. Ioppolo focuses her analyses on another sceptical philosopher – Clitomachus. The essay is motivated by the two main goals: the reconstruction of the Clitomachean position towards the opinion and the assent and the comparison of Clitomachus' and Carneades' positions. According to Ioppolo, Critolaus tried to find his own way in the conception of suspending the judgments; for the suspension of judgment was tantamount to refraining from any affirmation and negation. Critolaus wanted to save the possibility of the negative statements and attempted to justify that it was not spelled to abandon the sceptical position. Similar consideration was conducted and quite similar conclusions were reached by a Polish researcher A. Krokiewicz in his book *Sceptycyzm grecki (od Pirrona do Karneadesa)* [*The Greek Scepticism (from Pyrrhon to Carneades)*], Warszawa 1964, pp. 164 ff. M. Schofield's paper is devoted to the sceptical interpretation of Heraclitus' philosophy. Aensidemus, who revived Pyrrhonism in the first century BC, perceived some *sui generis* kinship between Pyrrhonism and Heracliteanism, but it is not in accord with Sextus Empiricus' description (Pyr. I 210–212), who misinterpreted the character of this relation. According to Schofield, both groups of philosophers accept the same form of inference between the given premise and conclusion, but for the Pyrrhonians the reasoning is valid only hypothetically, whereas the Heracliteans affirm it. Thus, Aensidemus' position is based neither on the dogmatic assertion nor on common sense or prejudgment of people, as it is claimed by Sextus. Schofield also describes the Pyrrhonism of Aensidemus, because this philosophical movement does not appear to him as the undifferentiated philosophical attitude, and challenges Woodruff's interpretation. Next, he reconstructs the Aensidemian concepts of the suspending of judgment and of the common affects and appearances, and then the approach to the Heraclitean philosophy made by the Stoics and Pyrrhonists. It appears that the Stoics misinterpreted Heraclitus' thought, according

to Aensidemus, and the reason is that they did not recognize that the epistemological use of common reason has much more affinity with the Pyrrhonian philosophy.

The last paper deals with the philosophical school which did not have its representative among the Greek philosophers who visited Rome in 155 BC, the Epicureanism. V. Tsouna presents the figure of Philodemus, an Epicurean philosopher whose library and scrolls were saved by the ashes of the Mount Vesuvius. At the centre of her attention is Philodemus' ethics and moral psychology. The traditional view on the Epicurean philosophy is that it did not change during the existence of the school, but V. Tsouna shows the development of the Epicurean thought. In her essay, she places Philodemus in the frame of this development. Philodemus accepted Epicurus' thesis that the mind is able to limit the body in the field of morality, but he perceived also the existence of some reactions in the body which cannot and should not be moved away. What is also important in the field of morality is that emotions and beliefs fulfil the predominant role in their generation according to Philodemus. Their specific kinds are called "bites" (δηγμός) and "pangs" (νυγμός). The paper is closed by the analysis of Philodemus' method and its epistemological foundation.

The entire book should be assessed very highly. The views defended in it are well-supported by accurate readings of the texts as well as by sound arguments.

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**Katharina Volk, *Manilius and his Intellectual Background***, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, XIV + 314 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-926522-0.

Manilius is not an easy poet: laden with astrological material and written in often contorted phrases that strive to reconcile mathematical matters with specific demands of the hexameter, his *Astronomica* pose a veritable challenge to a layman embarking on interpretative investigation. By contrast, those versed in astrology are often baffled by Manilius' classification systems, his failure to account for the nature of planets, and many other "curious" features. And yet, the enterprise is not without its rewards, a fact attested in the rising number of modern inquiries into Manilius' poetics, or, for those particularly given to the study of astrology, in the scholarly output of Wolfgang Hübner alone<sup>1</sup>.

An expert on Latin didactic poetry, Katharina Volk [= V.] produced a book that in virtue of its linguistic advantages and the relative rarity of the subjects is likely to become a standard reference work for any English-speaking scholar interested in the Roman poet or, for that matter, in the late Augustan culture. Hailed as "the first English-language monograph on Marcus Manilius", and praised as providing "a panorama of the cultural imagination of the Early Empire, a fascinating picture of the ways in which educated Greeks and Romans were accustomed to think and speak

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<sup>1</sup> The most important is undoubtedly his *Manilius als Astrologe und Dichter*, ANRW II 32, 1 (1984), pp. 126–320, but one could also mention *Die Dodekatropos des Manilius (Manil. 2, 856–970)*, Stuttgart 1995 or *Die Eigenschaften der Tierkreiszeichen in der Antike: Ihre Darstellung und Verwendung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Manilius*, Wiesbaden 1982 (Sudhoffs Archiv, Beiheft 22).